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RESUME
Ce travail étudie le lien entre le design des accords environnementaux interna-
tionaux et les décisions dinvestissement des entreprises dans de nouvelles technologies
de traitement de la pollution. Les deux types daccords étudiés dans ce travail sont
laccord de norme uniforme avec transferts et laccord de normes di¤érenciées sans
transfert. La principale question posée est celle du type daccord environnemental
international qui doit être annoncé et mis en uvre par les pays de façon optimale au
sens de Pareto. Ceci est e¤ectué dans le cadre dun modèle à plusieurs étapes où le
secteur privé décide de réaliser un investissement irréversible, étant donné le niveau
anticipé des normes de dépollution résultant des négociations bilatérales futures. Nos
travaux mettent en évidence un résultat qui peut paraître contre intuitif: il est opti-
mal, en présence de pays très hétérogènes, dannoncer et de mettre en uvre un accord
de norme uniforme avec transferts lorsque le coût irrécupérable de linstallation de
la technologie est faible et que les bénéces marginaux de la dépollution globale sont
élevés, tandis que ce nest plus le cas lorsque le coût irrécupérable de linstallation de
la technologie est élevé. Dans ce cas, la mise en uvre de laccord de norme uniforme
avec transferts donne le même niveau de paiement que celui au point de menace de
la négociation.
Mots-clés: accords, normes, transferts, adoption de technologie, investissement
irréversible, négociation, pollution transfrontalière.
ABSTRACT
This paper studies the link between the design of international environmental
agreements and the incentives for the private sector to invest in cleaner technologies.
More specically, it compares the performance, in the Pareto sense, of two types of
agreement: an agreement on a uniform standard with transfers and an agreement
on di¤erentiated standards without transfers. To achieve this goal, we use a multi-
stage game where the private sector anticipates its irreversible investment given the
expected level of abatement standards, resulting from future bilateral negotiations.
Our ndings indicate that whenever countries are able to partially commit, the agree-
ment on a uniform standard may be preferable, as it creates greater incentives for
rms to invest in costly abatement technology. This result relies on the low level of
the set-up cost of this technology. If this level is su¢ ciently high, the announcement
and implementation of the agreement on a uniform standard with transfers is not
optimal, because it takes away the incentive of all rms to invest in a new abatement
technology.
Keywords: agreements, standards, transfers, technology adoption, irreversible in-
vestment, bargaining, transboundary pollution.
JEL: Q50, C71.
2
1 Introduction
In the light of scientic evidence indicating the responsibility of human activity for the
climate change problem, the decision by the private sector to invest in environmentally
friendly technologies is crucial. Global climate change is, by its nature, a public good
problem. A rm which undertakes a clean-up activity does not fully capture the
benets of its e¤ort, which leads to a sub-optimal level of investment. Moreover, if
the investment in a cleaner technology represents a high level of sunk cost, the rm
will not be willing to invest in a new environmental technology.
The aim of this paper is to investigate the link between the design of international
environmental agreements (noted as IEAs hereafter) and the decision by rms to in-
vest in new clean-up technologies, in the presence of a transboundary pollution prob-
lem across two countries. A study by the OECD (2005) points out that  Clear and
concrete objectives and targets under multilateral environmental agreements (MEAs)
create a framework within which the business sector can both align its practices with
MEA goals and seize new business opportunities. Some MEAs include clear objec-
tives, e.g. those established under the Montreal and the Kyoto Protocols. Most MEAs,
however, have general objectives, which cannot always be easily translated into con-
crete action by the private sector...(p.6). These statements indicate the importance
of the design of IEAs in order to induce the business sector to undertake environmen-
tally friendly action. In this paper, we analyze, both from the positive and normative
points of view, the consequences of the type of IEAs on the decision by rms to
invest in a new abatement technology. From this perspective, we consider two types
of IEAs: an agreement on a uniform standard with transfers and an agreement on
di¤erentiated standards without transfers1. We mainly ask which one of the two
agreements must be negotiated to give the right incentives to rms to invest in a new
abatement technology, in the case of an excess of pollution.
Firstly, we consider an agreement on a uniform standard with transfers (UT). In
this context, a uniform standard means a uniform percentage reduction rate of the
emissions in a base year for all countries concerned by the environmental problem.
In fact, the majority of IEAs on transboundary pollution problems are characterized
by uniform standards (Hoel (1991), Finus, (2001)). Several theoretical arguments
can explain the implementation of uniform standards2. The transfer payments are
used in order to ensure the participation of some countries in the IEA. This type of
mechanism, which associates a uniform emission reduction target with a side pay-
ment scheme, is illustrated by the Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the
1In this paper, our aim is to analyse the consequences of these two types of IEAs, frequently
observed in reality, on the decision by rms to invest in a new abatement technology. We do not
try to explain why these two arrangements emerge.
2Some of these arguments are the following. The uniform rules could allow faster agreements
thanks to the perceived fair character of these types of rules. They could also prevent transac-
tion costs of the negotiation on di¤erentiated standards in the presence of asymmetric information
between countries.
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Ozone Layer (1987)3. As Luken and Grof (2006) point out, the implementation of
the Protocol has reduced the consumption of ozone-depleting substances by more than
90%. This Protocol specied an emission reduction of CFCs and halons by 20% based
on the 1986 emission levels, to be accomplished by 1998. The Parties to the Montreal
Protocol established the Multilateral Fund (MLF) in 1990. This fund consists of the
contributions of 49 industrialized countries which help developing countries in the
Protocol to cover their incremental costs in complying with the Protocols provisions.
Luken and Grof (2006, p.2) consider that the majority of the reduction in the con-
sumption of ozone depleting substances is provided by the projects implemented by
the MLF.
Secondly, we consider an agreement on di¤erentiated standards without trans-
fers (D). These agreements specify di¤erentiated percentage reduction rates of the
emissions of a base year for di¤erent countries. Here, di¤erentiated emission reduc-
tion targets already capture the asymmetry across countries; hence side payments
would not be necessary. This type of agreement is illustrated by the Kyoto Proto-
col on Climate Change (1997). This protocol imposes a uniform standard for some
countries of transition (the Czech Republic, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, the Slovak
Republic and Slovenia have agreed to reduce their 1990 emissions by 8%4) and dif-
ferentiated standards across di¤erent groups of countries. For instance, the Burden
Sharing Agreement in the EU implies di¤erentiated standards on the base of the 1990
emissions (Austria: -13%, France: 0%, Greece: +25%5)6. The Kyoto Protocol does
not explicitly specify a side payment scheme across countries (Chander and Tulkens
(2006), p.11). Transfers would be e¤ected by the international trading in emission
entitlements and the Clean Development Mechanism (Chander et al. (2002), p. 113;
Barrett (2003), p. 361).
This paper analyzes how the design of IEAs by countries, whether agreements
on a uniform standard with transfers or di¤erentiated standards without transfers,
a¤ects the decision of national rms to invest in a new abatement technology. To
do this, we use a multi-stage game with two asymmetric countries in terms of their
benets from global abatement. For the sake of simplicity, we assume the existence
of a representative rm in each country. We study a model in which the choice of
the type of agreement by countries and the choice of abatement technology by rms
are endogenenous. The choice of the type of the agreement results from the outcome
3The Stockholm Convention on Persistent Organic Pollutants (POPs), signed in 2001, has a
similar mechanism to the Montreal Protocol. This convention requires the signatory countries to
remove the production and the recent intentional use of POPs. Furthermore, a mechanism of
nancial assistance is incorporated in the provisions of the convention to ensure the participation of
the developing countries and the countries of transition in the convention.
4Source: Bailey (2003), p.183.
5Source: Bailey (2003), p.182.
6The Oslo Protocol on Further Reduction of Sulphur Emissions (1994) also implies di¤erentiated
standards.
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of negotiations on di¤erent agreements. The choice of technology is determined by
the comparison of the abatement costs associated with di¤erent technologies. This
analysis is conducted in the following way. We rst identify the e¤ects of the future
(negotiated) levels of abatement standards on the current investment decisions of
rms. Then, we investigate the conditions under which it is benecial for all countries
to implement one of the agreements in order to obtain a higher level of welfare, in the
contexts of irreversible investment by rms and a transboundary pollution problem
across countries.
Our paper shows a result which could seem counter intuitive: in the presence of
very asymmetric countries, the announcement and implementation of the uniform
agreement with transfers is optimal when the level of sunk cost of investment is su¢ -
ciently low and the level of the marginal benet from global abatement is su¢ ciently
high. However, this result does not hold if the level of sunk cost is su¢ ciently high.
In this case, the announcement and implementation of the uniform agreement with
transfers takes away the incentives of the private sector to invest, and provides the
same level of payo¤s for countries who cooperate as for those at the threat point.
The question studied in this paper is in line with two branches of the literature.
On the one hand, a part of the literature studies the relationship between national
environmental regulation7 (among others Arguedas and Hamoudi (2004), Bansal
and Gangopadhyay (2005)) or international environmental regulation (Golombek and
Hoel (2006)) and the decision to invest in technological change or adoption. Another
branch of the literature is related to the hold-up problem in industrial organization
(McLaren (1997), Muuls (2004))8 9.
Concerning the link between national environmental regulation and the decision
to invest in technological adoption, Arguedas and Hamoudi (2004) investigate the
conditions under which sanctions should depend on the environmental technology of
the rm together with the degree of noncompliance. The paper essentially compares
the welfare level for the regulator and the payo¤ level for the rm of two di¤erent
investment decisions: to invest before the announcement of the national policy, or
7See Ja¤e et al. (2002) for a survey of the literature.
8See for seminal papers Klein et al.(1978), Grossman and Hart (1986), and for recent applications
to the EU enlargement Wallner (2003), to the marketable emission permits Gersbach and Glazer
(1999).
9The paper by Buchholz and Konrad (1994), even though not completely related to these two
branches of the literature, needs to be mentioned. Buchholz and Konrad (1994) study the choice
between two abatement technologies in a two-stage game. They investigate the incentives of rms
to strategically commit to choose a costly abatement technology. The choice of technology is simply
reduced to the choice of unit emission reduction costs. The paper shows that it is individually
rational for a country to choose a costly abatement technology to increase its bargaining position.
This manifests via an increase in the payo¤ of the country at the threat point. This result comes
from two assumptions. First, the investing rm and the government which conducts negotiations
are considered as a unit identity. Secondly, the negotiating countries are assumed to be identical.
Since the emission levels of the countries are strategic substitutes, then the other country abates
more if one of the countries chooses a costly abatement technology.
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after. The ndings show that it is benecial for both parties if the rm invests in
technology before the policy is announced, in which case the rm has incentives to
over-invest, which reduces inspection frequencies and expected penalties. Concerning
the link between the national environmental regulation and the decision to invest
in technological change, Bansal and Gangopadhyay (2005) study the incentives of a
monopolistic rm to invest in R&D under regulatory standards, with the assumption
that consumers are willing to pay for environmentally friendly technologies. They
study the following regulations: the commitment policy which corresponds to setting
standards and nes before the rm undertakes its innovation e¤ort, and the Best
Available Technology (BAT) based policy which corresponds to setting standards on
the basis of the BAT and selecting a ne rate. The main result of the paper is that the
commitment policy provides the right incentive for a rm to invest in R&D, because
it reduces the uncertainty of innovation for rms.
To our knowledge, there is only the paper, by Golombek and Hoel (2006), which
deals with the interaction between the design of IEAs and the decision to invest
in technological change. They mainly compare two types of IEA in the presence
of technology spillovers across countries: a tax agreement and a quota agreement.
They show that the levels of abatement and investment in R&D are lower in the
tax agreement than those in the quota agreement. The low levels of the technology
subsidy for R&D investments and of the carbon tax in the tax agreement, imply lower
levels of abatement and R&D investments, and thus create ine¢ ciencies. For this
reason, social costs are lower in the quota agreement. The advantage of considering
a (n) country framework is, however, counter-balanced by the assumption that the
countries, and the rms in each country, are identical.
The question of decision to invest studied in this paper is in some ways similar
to the hold-up problem10. In a classical hold-up problem, a rm which considers a
relation-specic investment for the production of a good could prefer not to invest
if it anticipates the capture, by the consumer, of its rents in the future. In the case
of IEAs, a hold-up problem can appear if countries are willing to capture the ben-
ets of their rms, which undertake an investment in a new abatement technology,
by imposing more stringent international abatement standards on them. McLaren
(1997) analyzes a small countrys gains from bilateral trade liberalization. The rms
in this country anticipate future negotiations in favor of trade liberalization, then
invest accordingly, i.e. by realizing irreversible investments in the export sector. In
fact, the rms act as decentralized agents in the economy and reduce, by their com-
plete specialization, the exibility of the country when it bargains in the future. This
manifests by the reduction of its bargaining position in equilibrium, expressed in
concessions or side payments from the small country to the large one. Muuls (2004)
studies the dynamic e¤ects of irreversible investment on the bargaining position of
10It is a situation where the agent (the rm) must realize an initial investment before being in
contact with the principal (the country). The reason behind this situation is that the agent and the
principal could only meet once the investment is realized (La¤ont and Martimort (2002), p.370).
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countries in global negotiations on climate change. This is done in a two-countries,
two-periods model. The paper assumes that governments can commit to issue mar-
ketable permits, whereas they could not commit to a strong penalty for not meeting
the regulation. The main result of the paper is that there is an over-investment when
rms anticipate a Nash bargained agreement, compared to the rst-best investment
level. Hence, the hold-up problem does not appear. This result is interpreted as being
related to the global public good nature of the problem. The countries are linked by
the benets from global abatement and also on the cost side by permits.
The principal di¤erence of our paper from the rest of the literature relies on
the study of the e¤ects of the announced type of IEAs on the decision to adopt
technology by the private sector. Firmschoice of technology is based on the level of
variable abatement costs and the level of sunk cost of investment in a new abatement
technology. The simple two-country framework allows us to consider the case of
asymmetric countries in terms of their valuation of the global abatement. Contrary
to the approach of Buchholz and Konrad (1994), we let the country and the rm be
decentralized agents in the economy. Our paper essentially stresses the importance
of a partial commitment by the countries on the announced type of IEAs. However,
the countries do not need to commit to the negotiated levels of the provisions of the
agreement, such as the levels of abatement standards and transfers.
The article proceeds as follows. Section 2 represents the model and the tim-
ing of the game. Section 3 provides the description and the principal results of the
game. This description rst represents di¤erent negotiation problems associated with
the agreements on uniform and di¤erentiated standards (stage 3). Moreover, this de-
scription includes the study of two specic situations in terms of the decision to invest
by rms (stage 2). The description nishes with the analysis of the optimal choice of
the type of IEAs by countries (stage 1). Section 4 illustrates the theoretical results
by numerical applications on a quadratic example. Finally, Section 5 concludes.
2 The model
We consider two countries facing a transboundary pollution problem. These coun-
tries cooperate for the welfare of both in order to mitigate this pollution problem.
The countries are assumed to be asymmetric in terms of their benets from global
abatement or their degree of exposure to global pollution. We consider an environ-
mentally conscious country (ENCC ) (or a country very sensitive to global pollution),
and a less environmentally conscious country (LENCC ) (or a country less sensitive to
global pollution). This terminology is adopted from Petrakis and Xepapadeas (1996).
Remember that there is one representative rm in each country. Each rm has
rational expectations about the level of the abatement standard that will be negoti-
ated in the future, and consequently it minimizes its abatement cost. The negotiated
levels of abatement standards are determined by the use of the Nash bargaining so-
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lution (Nash (1950)) . The comparison of IEAs is realized on the base of the Pareto
criteria. It is worthwhile to note that we consider a model of perfect expectations
where all agents perfectly observe the actions of others and all states of nature.
2.1 Agents in the Economy
There are two types of agents in this economy: two countries and two rms, with one
representative rm in each country.
2.1.1 Countries
The countries rstly announce the type of the IEA, whether the agreement on a
uniform standard with transfers (UT) or the agreement on di¤erentiated standards
without transfers (D), then negotiate the precise levels of standards and transfers (A
and A in the agreement D,
 
A and t in the agreement UT).
The payo¤ functions of the ENCC and the LENCC are written, respectively, as
follows:
NB(x) = B(A+ A)  C(A; x)  t (1)
NB(x) = B(A+ A)  C(A; x) + t
where A (resp. A) represents the negotiated level of the abatement standard
of the ENCC (resp. LENCC) with A  1 (resp. A  1); x (resp. x) is the
decision to invest of the rm in the ENCC (resp. LENCC), expressed in a binary
way x 2 f0; 1g, and t > 0 are transfer payments across the countries. The function
B(:) is the benet function from global abatement, with B
0
(:) > 0 and B
00
(:) < 0:
The parameter  represents the asymmetry across the countries. Let 0 <  < 1
such that the LENCC has lower benets from global abatement than the ENCC. The
function C(A; x) represents the abatement cost function of the rm of the ENCC,
which depends on the negotiated level of the abatement standard, A; and on its own
decision to invest in a new abatement technology, x.
2.1.2 Firms
The rms decide to invest (x = 1) or not (x = 0) in a new abatement technology.
Consider a situation where national rms already have access to an abatement tech-
nology, which allows them to reduce their pollution. But the marginal abatement
costs associated with this technology are high. These rms also have the possibility
of investing in an alternative technology, which is associated with lower marginal
abatement costs. But this initial investment represents some sunk cost. We assume
that the rms of both countries have access to the same set of possible abatement
technologies.
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Concerning the functional forms, we assume that the abatement cost function is in-
creasing and convex in the case of investment in a new technology, i.e.
C
0
(A jx=1) > 0 et C 00(A jx=1) > 011. For the sake of simplicity, we use a linear
abatement cost function in the case of non-investment, i.e. C
00
(A jx=0) = 0. The
choice of linearity is not crucial12. We assume that the marginal abatement costs in
the case of investment are lower than those in the absence of investment13. This leads
to the following functions of abatement cost for the rm of the ENCC:
C(A) =
A2
2
+ F if x = 1 (2)
C(A) = A if x = 0
where x = 1 (resp. x = 0) represents the decision (resp. the absence) of investment
in a new abatement technology and F , with F > 0; represents the sunk cost of
installation of the new technology. This cost is independent of the scale of abatement
and is locked in (sunk) for some short length of time (Tirole (1988), p.212). These
costs can include the acquisition of a new plant and new machines (setup costs), or
hiring and training new engineers.
The curves of the two abatement cost functions - in the case of investment and in
the absence of investment - are illustrated in Figure 1.
2.2 Timing of the Game
We consider a multi-stage game under a perfect information environment. The game
has four stages, and the timeline is represented in Figure 2.
Stage 1: The countries collectively announce the type of the IEA which will
be negotiated in the future. In particular, they announce if they will negotiate an
11We use a convex variable abatement cost function in the case of investment, as do Muuls (2004)
and Bansal and Gangopadhyay (2005). The di¤erence of our abatement cost function from Muuls
is the use of a discrete technology choice variable, and also a sunk cost component. In the model of
technology development of Bansal and Gangopadhyay (2005), the cost of investment in technology
depends on R&D e¤orts.
12This choice of functional forms ensures the existence of interior solutions.
13This implies that the levels of the abatement standards are lower or equal to 1; A  1: This
interpretation is valid if we assume that the emission levels of a base year are the same for the two
countries and are normalized to 1: We can express this relationship in the following way: A = 
 
E
and A = 
 
E where   1 (resp.   1) is the percentage abatement rate for the ENCC (resp.
LENCC), and
 
E (resp.
 
E) is its emission level of a base year. To assume
 
E =
 
E = 1 allows us to
have A =   1 and A =   1:
We could justify it in the following way. Since the source of the pollution problem is the fact
that the countries did not undertake abatement activities before the signature of the agreement,
their emission levels in the past could be only determined by their respective size of population,
and not by their sensitivity to global pollution. We assume that the countries have the same size of
population, which could lead them to have the same level of emissions in a base year in the past.
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Figure 1: Abatement cost functions
Figure 2: Timing of the game
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agreement on a uniform standard with transfers or an agreement on di¤erentiated
standards without transfers. This collective decision between governments results
from bilateral negotiations which are not explicitly modeled in this paper. This sit-
uation can be considered as a pre-negotiation phase (Barrett (2003), p.139). This
situation can be interpreted in a di¤erent manner as well. As Barrrett (2003, p.139)
emphasizes, countries rst negotiate a convention, which establishes general princi-
ples, and then negotiate its protocolswhich prescribe precise obligations in specic
domains. This is the case of the Vienna Convention (1985) and its associated Mon-
treal Protocol (1987), the Framework-Convention of the United Nations on Climate
Change (1992) and its associated Kyoto Protocol (1997). This stage of the game can
thus be considered as an announcement stage following the signature of a convention,
whereas the negotiation at stage 3 of the game can be considered as a negotiation on
the di¤erent protocols of the convention.
Stage 2: The representative rm in each country decides whether to invest or not
in a new abatement technology. This initial investment is irreversible, and therefore
implies a sunk cost, but contributes to the reduction of the future marginal abatement
costs. The lag between the decision to invest by rms and the negotiation process of
governments could be justied by the time required for the investment in abatement
activities. The investment of the private sector is a long-term activity in the sense
that it takes time to construct new plants, to buy new machines and to hire and give
training to new engineers14.
It is important to note that we implicitly assume that the abatement decision of
a rm is independent of its decision on production. This property holds for a spe-
cic class of clean-up technologies called end-of-pipe, which represent the majority
of the abatement technologies currently used by rms15. Skea (2000) reports that
the proportion of end-of-pipe technologies in pollution control investment is 80% in
Belgium, 82% in Germany and 87% in France.
Stage 3: The countries bargain over the precise levels of standards and transfers.
If this is an agreement D, they negotiate the levels of di¤erentiated standards (A
and A). On the other hand, if this is an agreement UT, they negotiate the levels
of the uniform standard (
 
A) and the transfer (t). Here, we consider cooperative
behavior between governments in the sense that countries may prefer to improve
their payo¤s via a cooperative agreement. Thus we use the Nash bargaining solution
as equilibrium, in order to analyze the outcome of negotiations.
It is important to note that we implicitly assume that the governments respect
14As Hall and Khan (2003) stress, since the technology often is a specic asset, employees need
to be trained to operate the new technology. For example, in the case of the Kyoto Protocol, the
substitution technologies keep evolving, which indicates the time required for the investment in new
abatement technologies.
15End-of-pipe refers to equipment which can be attached to existing industrial processes in order
to mitigate the environmental consequences of their operation(Skea (2000), p.338). In this sense,
these abatement technologies are opposed to clean or beginning-of-pipetechnologies.
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their collective announcement of the type of the IEA, once the decisions to invest
are taken by rms. This means that the governments are able to commit for a
long span of time. This commitment could be justied in two ways. Firstly, the
initial announcement could be thought as cheap-talk because the announcement
on its own does not a¤ect the payo¤s of the countries. Secondly, the respect of the
announcement could be necessary if the governments consider some reputation e¤ects
on the international level or fear international sanctions in other negotiations.
Stage 4: The representative rm in each country abates according to the abate-
ment burden imposed by the agreement. We implicitly assume that the rm in each
country completely complies with these regulations. This requires the assumption
that the governments are able to commit to the stringency of a penalty for the rm
which does not respect standards. If the governments could not commit to these
penalties, the best response of a cost minimizing rm would be not to abate, and
then not to realize the investment.
The extent of this work is limited to the case where the government only uses
standards and transfers in order to induce the rm to invest. The governments
control ex post the emission levels of their rms, but do not intervene in such a way
as to attain a given objective of emission reduction. The decision to invest in a new
abatement technology belongs entirely to rms16.
It is worthwhile to note that there is an interaction between stages 2 and 3 of
this game. The current decisions to invest by the rms a¤ect the levels of abatement
standards and transfers that will be negotiated in the future. Correspondingly, the
anticipated levels of abatement standards and transfers that will be negotiated in the
future have an impact on the current investment decisions of the rms.
2.3 Resolution of the Game
We use the method of backward induction in order to determine the sub-game perfect
equilibrium of the game. At stage 4 of the game, we determine the total abatement
costs of rms by using formula 2. We start the backward induction at stage 3 of
the game, where the countries bargain over the levels of abatement standards and
transfers, after they have announced the type of the IEA at stage 1 of the game and
after they have observed the investment decisions of their rms at stage 2 of the
game. Then, we examine at stage 2 of the game, if the rms decide to invest or not in
a new abatement technology, after they have observed the collective announcement
of the countries about the type of the IEA, and by anticipating the future levels of
abatement standards that will be negotiated at stage 3 of the game. Finally, at stage
16Note also that we consider the IEAs which do not specify elements related to R&D investments.
As Golombek and Hoel (2006) argue, the rst reason is the di¢ culties in monitoring compliance of
R&D policies, and the other reason is the observation that the Kyoto agreement does not include
provisions related to R&D investments. Thus the IEAs considered in this paper do not include
negotiation variables on technological issues.
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1 of the game, we determine the collective announcement of the countries on the type
of the IEA. This announcement is realized by anticipating the investment decisions
of the rms in the future.
3 Description and Results of the Game
3.1 Stage 3: Negotiation of the e¤ective levels of abatement
standards
At this stage of the game, the countries negotiate the e¤ective levels of abatement
standards and transfers according to their collective announcement. As we have
already mentioned, we use the Nash bargaining solution in order to determine the
outcome of negotiations. In order to concentrate on the asymmetry of the countries
in terms of their environmental tastes, we assume that the two countries have the
same negotiation power.
Three situations of investment are possible17:
 Only the rm of the ENCC invests: x = 1 and x = 0
 All the rms invest: x = x = 1
 No rm invests: x = x = 0
In order to calculate the outcome of negotiations, we must rst dene the payo¤
levels at the threat point.
3.1.1 Nash Equilibrium
We assume that the countries choose Nash equilibrium strategies when they do not
cooperate. The objective of the ENCC is to maximize its payo¤s, taking the abate-
ment level of the LENCC, A; as given:
Max
A

B(A+ A)  x(A
2
2
+ F )  (1  x)A

(3)
s.c. A  1;A  1
The program of the LENCC is written in a similar way, only its benet function
di¤ers:
17Intuition leads us to say that the fourth situation, where only the rm of the LENCC invests,
x = 0 and x = 1; cannot happen. We show this impossibility for a small value of , in the
neighborhood of  = 0; in Appendix D2.
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MaxA

B(A+ A)  x(A
2
2
+ F )  (1  x)A

(4)
A  1;A  1
The rst-order conditions for the ENCC and the LENCC are respectively:8<: B
0
(A+ A) = Ax+ (1  x)
B
0
(A+ A) =
Ax + (1  x)

(5)
These conditions give the equality of the individual marginal benets from global
abatement to the individual marginal abatement costs.
In the following, we will dene the levels of abatement and welfare at the Nash
equilibrium in the case where only the rm of the ENCC invests (x = 1 and x = 0).
The results for the two other couples of investment decision, x = x = 1 and x =
x = 0; are provided respectively in Appendices B and C. If we consider the case where
only the rm of the ENCC invests, the levels of abatement at the Nash equilibrium
are dened in the following way:
^
A = 1 (6)
^
A

= B
0 1(
1

)  1
because the countries are asymmetric 0 <  < 1 and the levels of abatement
cannot exceed 1:
These abatement levels at the Nash equilibrium give us the payo¤ levels
^
NB and
^
NB

at the threat point of the negotiation:
^
NB = B(B
0 1(
1

))  1
2
  F (7)
^
NB

= B(B
0 1(
1

)) B0 1( 1

) + 1
Once the payo¤s at the Nash equilibrium are calculated, we can nd the outcome
of negotiations for the two types of IEAs and compare the negotiated abatement
levels. We rst start by analyzing the outcome of negotiation of an agreement of
di¤erentiated standards without transfers.
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3.1.2 Di¤erentiated Standards without Transfers
The Nash bargaining solution writes:
MaxA;A

B(A+ A)  x(A
2
2
+ F )  (1  x)A 
^
NB

 (8)
B(A+ A)  x(A
2
2
+ F )  (1  x)A  
^
NB

A  1;A  1
If we note V = U  U; given an interior solution, the rst-order conditions are
as follows:
@V
@A
= 0() @U

@A
U +
@U
@A
U = 0 (9)
()
h
B
0
(A+ A)
i
U +
h
B
0
(A+ A)  xA  (1  x)
i
U = 0
@V
@A
= 0() @U

@A
U +
@U
@A
U = 0 (10)
()
h
B
0
(A+ A)  xA   (1  x)
i
U +
h
B
0
(A+ A)
i
U = 0
If we take the ratio of the rst-order conditions, we obtain:
B
0
(A+ A)
[B0(A+ A)  xA   (1  x)] =

B
0
(A+ A)  xA  (1  x)
B0(A+ A)
(11)
which implicitly denes the contract curve where the solution lies. The contract
curve represents the locus of points along which the indi¤erent curves of the two
countries are tangent.
By rearranging the rst-order conditions, we also have:
B
0
(A+ A)(U + U) = xAU + (1  x)U (12)
B
0
(A+ A)(U + U) = xAU + (1  x)U
which implicitly denes the agreement locuswhere the solution lies. This locus
determines the specic point on the contract curve. This point represents the outcome
of the international agreement on di¤erentiated standards without transfers and is
given by the Nash bargaining solution.
In our case where the ENCC invests and the LENCC does not invest (x = 1 and
x = 0), Condition 11 becomes:
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B
0
(A+ A) =
A
1 + A
(13)
which is the expression of the marginal benet from global abatement.
Condition 12 becomes:
B
0
(A+ A)(U + U) = AU (14)
B
0
(A+ A)(U + U) = U
which implies:
AU = U (15)
As A  1 by denition, the gains from cooperation of the LENCC (relative to
its payo¤ at the threat point) are superior or equal to those for the ENCC; i.e.
U  U; in the agreement of di¤erentiated standards without transfers: This result
can be explained in the following way. Since the LENCC benets less from global
abatement (0 <  < 1) and its rm does not invest in a new technology, then its
negotiated di¤erentiated standard is low whereas that of the ENCC is high for the
opposite reasons. Then, the low abatement costs of the LENCC compensate, in
certain cases, for its low abatement benets from global abatement. This, in turn,
could make the LENCC better o¤ compared to the ENCC.
We now analyze the outcome of negotiation for an agreement on a uniform stan-
dard with transfers.
3.1.3 Uniform Standard with Transfers
The Nash bargaining solution is written in the following way in this case:
Max 
A;t
24B( A+  A)  x(  A2
2
+ F )  (1  x)
 
A  t 
^
NB
35 (16)
24B( A+  A)  x(  A2
2
+ F )  (1  x)
 
A+ t 
^
NB

35
 
A  1
In this program, the abatement standards must be equal between the countries,
but transfers can be positive. We proceed in the same manner as the preceding
sub-section.
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If we note V = U  U; given an interior solution, the rst-order conditions are
the following:
@V
@
 
A
= 0() @U

@
 
A
U +
@U
@
 
A
U = 0 (17)
()

2B
0
(
 
A+
 
A)  x
 
A  (1  x)

U +

2B
0
(
 
A+
 
A)  x
 
A  (1  x)

U = 0
@V
@t
= 0() @U

@t
U +
@U
@t
U = 0() U   U = 0
() U = U
The gains from cooperation of the countries are identical in the presence of uni-
form standards with transfers. This result can be explained by the presence of side
payments. In fact, the preferred level of the uniform standard diverges for the two
countries. The fact that the LENCC benets less from global abatement and its
rm does not invest in a new technology decreases its preferred level, whereas the
preferred level by the ENCC is higher since it benets more from global abatement
and its rm has lower marginal abatement costs thanks to the investment. Transfers
allow an equal share of the negotiation surplus by the two countries.
This property leads to the following relationship:
() U

2B
0
(
 
A+
 
A)  x
 
A  (1  x) + 2B0(
 
A+
 
A)  x
 
A  (1  x)

= 0 (18)
() B0(
 
A+
 
A) =
 
A(x+ x) + 2  x  x
2(+ 1)
because U 6= 0 (19)
which is the expression of the marginal benet from global abatement.
In the following, we use the conditions on the expression of the marginal benet
from global abatement in di¤erent agreements, in order to compare the levels of
di¤erentiated standards with the level of the uniform standard18.
3.1.4 Comparison of the Levels of Standards
The comparison of the abatement levels for the couples of decision of investment
x = 1 et x = 019; x = x = 1 and x = x = 0 is provided respectively in Appendices
18It is easy to show, by using the rst-order conditions, that the negotiated abatement levels are
independent of the level of sunk cost F: Even though the level of sunk cost has a crucial role in
the investment decision of the rms, it does not a¤ect the negotiated abatement levels. This is so,
because in the timing of the game, the levels of abatement standards and transfers are negotiated
after the investment decision of the private sector and the abatement cost function is additively
separable.
19Here, we use Conditions 13 and 19 on the expression of the marginal benet from global abate-
ment in order to compare the negotiated abatement levels in di¤erent agreements. The proof of
Lemma 1, in this case, requires the technical assumption B0(0) > 12 when  = 0:
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A1, B4 and C4. We obtain the following result:
Lemma 1
 
A is necessarily located between A and A; or more precisely
A <
 
A < A for very asymmetric countries (a small value of ; in the neighborhood
of 0):
This lemma shows that for every possible conguration of the choice of investment
of the rms, the level of the uniform standard is situated between the two di¤eren-
tiated standards when the countries are very asymmetric20. This result conrms the
intuition that the LENCC abates less than the ENCC in the di¤erentiated agreement
when the rm of the former does not invest and the rm of the latter invests. Since
the uniform standard reects the preferences of both countries, its level is situated
between the two levels of di¤erentiated standards.
The task we should deal with now is the comparison of the levels of the uniform
standard obtained from di¤erent congurations of investment (see Appendix E). This
task is di¢ cult to realize with the levels of di¤erentiated standards. We nd that
 
A(x = x = 1) 
 
A(x = 1;x = 0) 
 
A(x = x = 0): This indicates that the uniform
standard, when all the rms invest, is superior to or equal to that obtained when
only the rm of the ENCC invests, and to that obtained when no rm invests. The
investment of the rm contributes to the increase of the uniform standard.
3.2 Stage 2: Decision of investment of the rms
We analyze the investment choice of the rms according to the type of the IEA. The
investment decision of a rm requires the satisfaction of two conditions: the threshold
condition and the cost condition.The rst condition implies that the negotiated abate-
ment level exceeds the threshold abatement level

A above which it is advantegeous
to invest:
 threshold condition: A >

A
This threshold abatement level is found by the intersection of the two cost curves,
the one when the rm invests, (A
2
2
+F ); and the other when the rm does not invest,
(A) :
A2
2
+ F = A() A
2
2
  A+ F = 0 (20)
()

A = 1 p1  2F (21)
with

A  1 and 1  2F  0() F  1
2
:
20When no rms invest, x = x = 0; this result always holds for every value of the parameter ;
by the assumption on the form of the benet function.
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A rm has an interest in investing if the level of sunk cost is su¢ ciently low
(F  1=2). It is easy to check that the threshold abatement is an increasing and
convex function of F:
It is important to note that the threshold condition is a necessary condition, but
not a su¢ cient one. A rm will have the right incentives to invest in a new technology
if the cost condition is also satised.
 cost condition: C(A jx=1) < C(A jx=0)
Thus, a rm does not invest if its costs when it invests (with an implied level of
the abatement standard) exceed those when it does not invest (with another implied
level of the abatement standard), and this even if the negotiated abatement standard
is higher than the threshold abatement level. This situation could illustrate the hold-
up problem. The idea is the following: given that the rms have invested in a new
abatement technology, the countries agree on higher levels of abatement standards.
These high-level standards could make rms worse o¤ compared to a situation of
non-investment. More precisely, their costs in the case of investment could exceed
those in the case of non-investment. Hence the rms could prefer not to invest.
We now describe all the permutations in rmschoice of investment (see Table 3).
Firstly, we show in Appendix D2 that the LENCC never has incentives to invest in
the di¤erentiated agreement, when the parameter  is very small. Since the LENCC
is not very sensitive to global pollution in this case, it has no interest in abating much,
and this countrys rm is not willing to invest. Then, we exclude from the analysis
the case where no rm invests, no matter which type of agreement is implemented.
This could be the case when the level of sunk cost is too high. Furthermore, it is
impossible that only one country invests in the case of implementation of the uniform
agreement. It is obvious that the investment decisions of the two countries could not
diverge in the uniform agreement, because there is a common standard imposed on all
the countries, and the rms dispose of the same set of possible abatement technologies.
Finally,we did some simple numerical applications to check if it is possible that no
rm invests when a di¤erentiated agreement is announced (non-satisfaction of the
threshold condition for the LENCC and non-satisfaction of the cost condition for the
ENCC) and that all the rms invest when a uniform agreement is announced. For
the values of the parameters of interest (satisfying the conditions on the concavity of
objective and social welfare functions), we observe that this case cannot happen.
In this paper, we essentially focus on two situations for which the equilibrium is
unique21. The rst situation is the incentive uniform standard. In this case, the
21A natural question is to ask why we deal with these two specic situations. In fact, the objective
of the countries is to induce their rms to invest in a new abatement technology, because they obtain
higher levels of gain from cooperation in this case (the UT agreement where all the rms invest)
compared to all other cases (the UT agreement where no rm invests and the D agreement where
only the rm of the ENCC invests).
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Figure 3: Investment decisions of rms
announcement and implementation of the uniform agrement with transfers gives an
incentive to both countries to invest, whereas the announcement and implementation
of the di¤erentiated agreement without transfers would induce only the ENCC to in-
vest. The other situation is the disincentive uniform standard. In this case, follow-
ing the announcement and implementation of the uniform agreement with transfers,
no rm invests, whereas the announcement and implementation of the di¤erentiated
agreement without transfers would induce the ENCC to invest.
We now dene the incentive uniform standard and the disincentive uniform
standardcases.
Denition 1 We call an incentive uniform standard (resp. a disincentive
uniform standard) the situation where
a) the countries collectively announce an agreement on a uniform standard with
transfers
b) all the rms invest (resp. no rms invest)
c) the countries negotiate the precise levels of the uniform standard and the trans-
fer
d) the rms abate according to the obligations of the agreement
In the following, we study the conditions of existence of the two situations. We
start by the incentive uniform standardcase.
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Figure 4: The incentiveand disincentiveuniform standards
a) Incentive uniform standard
It is a situation where the announcement and implementation of the uni-
form agrement with transfers gives an incentive to both countries to invest, whereas
the announcement and implementation of the di¤erentiated agreement without trans-
fers would induce only the ENCC to invest. After the announcement of a uniform
agrement with transfers, a rm invests if it anticipates a negotiated level of the uni-
form standard such that the threshold and the cost conditions are met. Or in other
words, the level of the uniform standard exceeds the threshold abatement level above
which it is advantegeous to invest, and the costs of the rm when it invests are lower
than its costs when it does not invest. Figure 4 illustrates the incentive uniform
standard from the point of view of the threshold condition. It represents the curve of
the threshold abatement, in the case where only the rm of the ENCC invests. On
the Y-ordinate of the gure, we also indicate the negotiated abatement standards -
di¤erentiated standards A1 and A1 and the uniform standard
 
A1 in the case x = 1
and x = 0 - that we know their ranking in the case of asymmetric countries .
Let us suppose that the threshold is presented by the point P on Figure 4. For
a given level of sunk cost F , the announcement and implementation of di¤erentiated
standards gives the right incentives to the rm of the ENCC to invest (assuming that
the cost condition is met), because the abatement standard of the ENCC exceeds
the threshold, whereas they do not have the same e¤ect for the rm of the LENCC,
because the standard of the LENCC falls below the threshold. On the other hand,
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the announcement and implementation of the uniform standard gives the right in-
centives to both countries to invest (assuming that the cost condition is satised),
because the uniform standard exceeds the threshold. This means that, in this case,
the announcement and implementation of the uniform standard has a higher incentive
e¤ect (x = x = 1) than those of di¤erentiated standards (x = 1 and x = 0):
We call A;A and
 
A respectively the di¤erentiated standard of the ENCC, the
di¤erentiated standard of the LENCC and the uniform standard. The negotiated
abatement levels resulting from di¤erent investment decisions are written in the fol-
lowing way:
x = 1; x = 0 =) A1; A1;
 
A1
x = x = 1 =) A2; A2;
 
A2
x = x = 0 =) A3; A3;
 
A3
We now characterize the conditions of existence of an incentive uniform stan-
dard:
1) The rm in the LENCC does not invest in the agreement on di¤erentiated
standards without transfers.
threshold condition: A1 <

A or
cost condition: A1 >

A and A1 <
A22
2
+ F
2) The rm in the ENCC invests in the agreement on di¤erentiated standards
without transfers.
A1 >

A and
A21
2
+ F < A3
3) The rms in the ENCC and the LENCC invest in the agreement on a uniform
standard with transfers.
 
A1 >

A and
 
A
2
2
2
+ F <
 
A1 and
 
A
2
2
2
+ F <
 
A3
We now turn to the analysis of the disincentive uniform standard.
b) Disincentive uniform standard
It is a situation where the announcement and implementation of the uni-
form agreement with transfers takes away the incentive of both countries to invest,
whereas the announcement and implementation of the di¤erentiated agreement with-
out transfers would induce the ENCC to invest. This could happen because of two
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reasons. Firstly, the level of the uniform standard falls below the threshold abate-
ment level (non-satisfaction of the threshold condition). Secondly, the rm does not
invest because it anticipates higher abatement costs when it invests, compared to
those when it does not invest (non-satisfaction of the cost condition). Figure 4 also
illustrates the disincentive uniform standard from the point of view of the threshold
condition.
Let us suppose that the threshold is presented by the point M on Figure 4. For
a given level of sunk cost F , the announcement and implementation of di¤erentiated
standards leads to the same consequences in terms of investment decisions as in
the incentive uniform standardcase. On the other hand, the announcement and
implementation of the uniform standard takes away the incentives of both countries
to invest, because the uniform standard falls below the threshold. This means that,
in this case, the announcement and implementation of the uniform standard has a
lower incentive e¤ect (x = x = 0) than that of di¤erentiated standards (x = 1 and
x = 0):
We now turn to the characterization of the conditions of existence of a disincen-
tive uniform standard:
1) The rm in the LENCC does not invest in the agreement on di¤erentiated
standards without transfers.
threshold condition: A1 <

A or
cost condition: A1 >

A and A1 <
A22
2
+ F
2) The rm in the ENCC invests in the agreement on di¤erentiated standards
without transfers.
A1 >

A and
A21
2
+ F < A3
These two conditions are common to the cases of incentive uniform standard
and disincentive uniform standard.
3) The rms in the ENCC and the LENCC do not invest in the agreement on a
uniform standard with transfers.
threshold condition :
 
A1 <

A or
cost condition:
 
A1 >

A and
 
A
2
1
2
+ F >
 
A3 and
 
A
2
2
2
+ F >
 
A3
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c) Numerical illustration
In order to characterize the conditions of existence of the incentive uni-
form standardand disincentive uniform standardcases, we focus on the case of
very asymmetric countries, i.e. the case where the parameter  is small (the LENCC
is not very sensitive to global pollution), in the neighborhood of 0: In fact, there is
no role to play for the type of IEAs in terms of the incentives to provide to the
private sector to invest, when the countries are identical (the case of  = 1). In this
case, the countries have the same sensitivity to global abatement. Then the levels
of di¤erentiated standards are the same, the standard is uniform. Furthermore, we
know that the national rms have, by denition, the same set of possible abatement
technologies. Under these properties, the announcement and implementation of stan-
dards (no matter whether di¤erentiated or uniform) leads either to the absence of
investment or to full investment by all the rms, according to the level of sunk cost
of investment. It turns out that the levels of welfare only depend on the existence or
the absence of investment, and do not depend on the type of the IEA.
In Appendix F, we dene the negotiated levels of standards regarding the invest-
ment decisions of rms, when  = 0. By continuity, the results still hold in the
neighborhood of  = 0: Below, we summarize these results:
A1 = A

2 = A

3 = 0 and A1 = A2 = A = B
0 1(A) and A3 = B
0 1(1)
 
A1 = 2B
0
(2
 
A1)  1 and
 
A2 = B
0
(2
 
A2) and
 
A3 =
1
2
B
0 1
(1)
It is then possible to dene the conditions related to the existence of the in-
centive uniform standardand disincentive uniform standardcases by using these
expressions of abatement standards, which are usually dened as implicit functions.
In order to simplify the interpretation of these conditions, we illustrate them by a
quadratic example. We provide in Section 4 an illustration of the theoretical results
by a quadratic example (quadratic benet function) in the case where the LENCC
is not very sensitive to global abatement ( = 0:001): We provide here the results
on the investment decision of the rms. In this case, we check the theoretical result
obtained, that the LENCC never has incentives to invest if an agreement of di¤er-
entiated standards is implemented. The reason is that the abatement standard is
so low that it falls below the threshold. Then, we have a situation where the an-
nouncement and implementation of the agreement D leads only the ENCC to invest.
Figure 5 illustrates the di¤erent values of sunk cost for which the incentive uniform
standardand disincentive uniform standardcases happen. It represents the curve
of the threshold abatement in the case where only the rm of the ENCC invests.
We notice, on the one hand, that the implementation of the agreement of uniform
standards with transfers gives the right incentives to invest to all rms for a low value
of sunk cost, i.e. F < 0:3748 (incentive uniform standard): The same agreement
completely takes away the incentives to invest for both rms when the level of sunk
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Figure 5: Example of investment decision
cost is high, i.e. 0:375 < F < O:5; in which case the level of the uniform standard
falls below the threshold abatement level (disincentive uniform standardrelated to
the threshold condition). The absence of investment related to the cost condition is
illustrated for a medium level of sunk cost, i.e. 0:3748 < F < 0:375 (disincentive
uniform standardrelated to the cost condition)22.
We now study Stage 1 of the game.
3.3 Stage 1: Optimal choice of the type of the IEA
At this stage of the game, the countries optimally choose the type of the IEA. The
optimality is dened in the Pareto sense. This means that the individual welfare of a
country in the optimal agreement must exceed the one in the alternative agreement,
and the other country must obtain at least the same individual welfare as in the
alternative agreement.
We present here the principal proposition of the paper.
Proposition 1 a) In the case of very asymmetric countries (small ),
the announcement and implementation of the agreement of uniform standards with
22In the simpler particular case where the abatement cost function is linear,
C =
h
x AF2 + (1  x)A
i
+ xF where F2 is a constant superior to 1; and where the benet
function is linear, the uniform standard is always an incentive, and never a disincentive.
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transfers is optimal for each country if the level of sunk cost is su¢ ciently low (F
low) and if the marginal benets from global abatement are su¢ ciently high (B
0
(:)
high) [incentive uniform standard].
b) It is no longer optimal for a higher level of sunk cost (F high) [disincentive
uniform standard].
In order to show this proposition, we will analyze the conditions under which it
is benecial or not for the countries to announce the agreement of uniform standards
with transfers, when they anticipate that all the rms will invest, or that no rm
will invest. To show part (a) of the proposition, we will show in Proposition (1a),
the optimality of the announcement of the uniform agreement with transfers in the
case where the countries anticipate that their rms will invest. In order to show
part (b) of the proposition, we will show in Proposition (1b) the sub-optimality of
the announcement of the uniform agreement with transfers in the case where the
countries anticipate that their rms will not invest.
a) Incentive uniform standard
The property of subgame perfect equilibrium of the model requires that
the announcement (and implementation) of the uniform agreement with transfers is
optimal, when the rms in the ENCC and the LENCC invest. The individual welfare
of a country in this case then needs to exceed the welfare which would prevail in the
di¤erentiated agreement without transfers when only the rm of the ENCC invests.
The other country must obtain at least the same individual welfare as in the latter
agreement.
The condition we are looking for is the following:
(ENCC)
24B( A+  A)   A2
2
  F   t 
^
NB2
35  B(A+ A)  A2
2
  F  
^
NB1

(22)
(LENCC)
24B( A+  A)   A2
2
  F + t 
^
NB

2
35  B(A+ A)  A   ^NB1
and for one of the two countries,
the inequality is strict.
where
^
NB1 (resp.
^
NB

1) and
^
NB2 (resp.
^
NB

2) represent respectively the levels
of welfare of the ENCC (resp. LENCC) at the threat point of the negotiations when
the investment decisions are x = 1; x = 0 and x = x = 1:
Our reference point in the analysis of welfare is the situation where the LENCC
has no sensitivity to global pollution, i.e.  = 023.
23See Appendix G1 for the proof of this proposition and Appendix G2 for an illustration of the
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Proposition 1a In the case where  = 0, the uniform agreement with
transfers when all the rms invest, dominates in the Pareto sense, the di¤erentiated
agreement without transfers when only the rm of the ENCC invests, if (B
0
(2
 
A)) is
su¢ ciently large.
We can nd a similar result for a small value of , in the neighborhood of  = 0,
using a continuity argument of the optimal social welfare functions (or the functions
of the Nash bargaining solution) at the di¤erentiated agreement when only the rm of
the ENCC invests and at the uniform agreement when both rms invest. By Berges
theorem of the maximum (de la Fuente (2000)), it can be shown that the social welfare
function and the set of maximizers change continuously with the parameters, given
that the objective function is continuous. Since our functions of the Nash bargaining
solution are continuous, the superior (in the sense of Pareto) result of the uniform
agreement when all rms invest over the di¤erentiated agreement, when only the rm
of the ENCC invests, holds for a small value of the parameter , in the neighborhood
of  = 0.
This result can be summarized and explained in the following way. In the presence
of very asymmetric countries, the announcement (and implementation) of a uniform
agreement with transfers is optimal, if the level of sunk cost is su¢ ciently low and
the level of the marginal benet from global abatement is su¢ ciently high. In the
presence of a low sunk cost of investment, the announcement (and implementation)
of the uniform agreement with transfers induces all the rms to invest in a new
abatement technology, whereas that of the di¤erentiated agreement without transfers
induces only the rm of the ENCC to invest. In the presence of a high marginal
benet from global abatement, the implementation of the uniform agreement with
transfers, when all the rms invest, provides better levels of gain from cooperation
than that of the di¤erentiated agreement without transfers, where only the rm of the
ENCC invests. In fact, the existence of a side payment scheme compensates for the
additional abatement e¤orts in the LENCC in the uniform agreement, and therefore
induces it to participate in the cooperative agreement.
We can interpret these results in the following way. In the presence of a country
which is not very environmentally conscious (LENCC), - which would agree on a
very low abatement standard in the negotiations of a di¤erentiated agreement -, it
is Pareto-improving for the countries to announce in advance that they will nego-
tiate a uniform agreement with transfers in the future, in order to induce the rm
of the LENCC to invest. In fact, the rm of the LENCC would anticipate a higher
abatement standard in this case compared to that which would prevail in the nego-
tiation of di¤erentiated standards. Furthermore, it anticipates that this level of the
uniform standard will maintain its incentives to invest in terms of total abatement
costs. Hence the rm of the LENCC prefers to invest. This result depends, however,
on a low level of sunk cost of investment in the new abatement technology.
same proposition by a quadratic example with  = 0:
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b) Disincentive uniform standard
The property of subgame perfect equilibrium of the model requires that
the announcement (and implementation) of the di¤erentiated agreement without
transfers is optimal for each country, when only the rm of the ENCC invests. The
individual welfare of a country in this case then needs to exceed the welfare which
would prevail in the uniform agreement with transfers when no rm invests. The other
country must obtain at least the same individual welfare as in the latter agreement.
The condition we are looking for is the following:
(ENCC)

B(A+ A)  A
2
2
  F  
^
NB1



B(
 
A+
 
A) 
 
A  t 
^
NB3

(23)
(LENCC)

B(A+ A)  A  
^
NB

1



B(
 
A+
 
A) 
 
A+ t 
^
NB

3

and for one of the two countries,
the inequality is strict.
where
^
NB1 (resp.
^
NB

1) and
^
NB3 (resp.
^
NB

3) represent respectively the levels
of welfare of the ENCC (resp. LENCC) at the threat point of the negotiations when
the investment decisions are x = 1; x = 0 and x = x = 0:
Our reference point in the analysis of welfare is still the situation where the
LENCC has no sensitivity to global pollution, i.e.  = 0.
Proposition 1b In the case where  = 0, the di¤erentiated agreement
without transfers when only the rm of the ENCC invests dominates, in the Pareto
sense, the uniform agreement with transfers when no rm invests.
We show24 that the payo¤s of cooperation do not improve upon the non-cooperative
outcome in both the uniform agreement when no rm invests and the di¤erentiated
agreement when only the rm of the ENCC invests. We can nd a similar result for
a small value of , in the neighborhood of  = 0, using a continuity argument of the
optimal social welfare functions in the di¤erentiated case when only the rm of the
ENCC invests and in the uniform case when no rm invests.
In order to have an idea of the welfare levels of the countries, we should investi-
gate those at the respective threat points of the countries, when  = 0. It is easy to
show that, in the two cases where only the rm of the ENCC invests and where no
rm invests, the payo¤ of the LENCC at the threat point is zero. Using a quadratic
example, we evaluate the payo¤ levels of the ENCC at the Nash equilibrium in both
these cases. We nd that the ENCC prefers to invest rather than not to invest at its
threat point, when the level of sunk cost is lower than (1=2), which is the maximum
24See Appendix G3 for the proof of this proposition.
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allowable level of sunk cost given the denition of the threshold abatement. Conse-
quently, it is individually rational for the ENCC to invest at the Nash equilibrium,
when the LENCC does not invest, if the level of sunk cost is lower than 1=2.
Our ndings indicate that, in the presence of very asymmetric countries, the
announcement and implementation of the uniform agreement with transfers is not
optimal if the level of sunk cost is su¢ ciently high. For such a level of sunk cost,
the announcement and implementation of the uniform agreement takes away the
incentives of the rm in the ENCC to invest. Moreover, the implementation of this
agreement, in the case where no rm invests, is not able to generate positive gains
from cooperation for each country.
We can interpret these results in the following way. In the presence of a high
level of sunk cost, the announcement and implementation of the uniform agreement
removes the incentives of the rm in the LENCC as well as the rm in the ENCC
to invest in a new abatement technology. There are two reasons for that to happen:
on the one hand, the level of the uniform standard could not exceed the threshold
abatement level (because the sunk cost is high); on the other hand, given that the
rms have invested in a new abatement technology, the negotiated level of the uniform
standard will be higher, which is more costly for the rms. By anticipating this, the
rms prefer not to invest. It is the fear of a hold-up by the countries which induces
the rms not to invest in a costly abatement technology.
In order to simplify the interpretation of the conditions related to the existence of
the situations incentive uniform standardand disincentive uniform standard, we
will provide an example with a quadratic benet function, in the case of very asym-
metric countries ( small). Then, we illustrate the results by a numerical application.
4 A Numerical Illustration: Quadratic Case
The benet function has the following form:
B(A+ A) = b(A+ A)  d
2
(A+ A)2 (24)
where b > 0, d > 0; B
0
(:) > 0 and B
00
(:) < 0: Here, the parameters b and d explain
the environmental preferences of the countries, or in other words, they describe how
the global pollution a¤ects the payo¤s of the countries.
In the case where the parameter  is null ( = 0), this specication of the benet
function leads to the following negotiated abatement levels:
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A1 =
b
1 + d
; A1 = 0;
 
A1 =
2b  1
1 + 4d
;
A2 =
b
1 + d
; A2 = 0;
 
A2 =
b
1 + 2d
;
A3 =
b  1
d
; A3 = 0;
 
A3 =
b  1
2d
Given these levels of negotiated standards, we can nally write, in an explicit
way, the conditions of existence of the situations incentive uniform standardand
disincentive uniform standard(see Appendix H for more detail).
a) Incentive uniform standard
The condition which leads to the emergence of the situation incentive
uniform standard can be reduced to the following condition on the value of sunk
cost F :
F < minf

1
2
  1
2
(1  2b  1
1 + 4d
)2

;

2b  1
1 + 4d
  1
2
(
b
1 + 2d
)2

; (25)
1
2
  1
2
(1  b
1 + d
)2

;

b  1
d
  1
2
(
b
1 + d
)2

;
b  1
2d
  1
2
(
b
1 + 2d
)2

;

1
2

g
For the appropriate values of the parameters b and d; all the terms on the
righthandside of the inequality are strictly positive; hence the situation incentive
uniform standard from the point of view of investment decision emerges. In fact,
for this particular level of sunk cost, the announcement (and implementation) of dif-
ferentiated standards gives the incentives to invest only to the rm of the ENCC. In
contrast, the announcement (and implementation) of uniform standard induces both
rms to invest in a new abatement technology.
b) Disincentive uniform standard
The conditions which lead to the emergence of the situation disincentive
uniform standardcan be reduced to two distinct conditions on the value of sunk cost
F :
* (threshold condition)

1
2
  1
2
(1  2b  1
1 + 4d
)2

< F < minf

1
2
  1
2
(1  b
1 + d
)2

;(26)
b  1
d
  1
2
(
b
1 + d
)2

;

1
2

g
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* (cost condition) max

b  1
2d
  1
2
(
b
1 + 2d
)2

;

b  1
2d
  1
2
(
2b  1
1 + 4d
)2

(27)
< F < minf

1
2
  1
2
(1  b
1 + d
)2

;

b  1
d
  1
2
(
b
1 + d
)2

;
1
2
  1
2
(1  2b  1
1 + 4d
)2

;

1
2

g
On the one hand, given that a value of sunk cost verifying Condition 26 exists, the
situation disincentive uniform standardbecause of the threshold condition arises.
In fact, for this particular value of sunk cost, the implementation of di¤erentiated
standards gives the incentives to invest only to the rm of the ENCC, whereas the
adoption of a uniform standard removes this incentive. When an agreement on a uni-
form standard with transfers is announced and implemented, no rm invests because
the level of the uniform standard falls below the threshold abatement.
One the other hand, given that a value of sunk cost verifying Condition 27 exists,
the situation disincentive uniform standardbecause of the cost condition arises. For
this particular value of sunk cost, the same outcome results as for the threshold con-
dition. But the reason behind the absence of investment is di¤erent: when a uniform
agreement is implemented, even though the level of the uniform standard exceeds the
threshold abatement, the rms prefer not to invest, because their abatement costs
are lower in this case than they would be if they decided to invest.
We now illustrate the results of the model by a numerical example based on a
quadratic benet function.
c) Numerical illustration
We did some numerical applications by moving the parameters b and d:
We control for the constraint that the negotiated abatement levels are lower or equal
to 1, for the constraints on the concavity of the objective and social welfare functions,
for the positivity of the payo¤s from cooperation and the gains from cooperation of
the countries. The conditions on the concavity of the social welfare function in the
case of di¤erentiated standards without transfers are veried for the high values of
the parameters b and d moving from 750 to 1000, and for which the di¤erence (b  d)
is equal to 1. We consider the following values of the parameters:  = 0:001; b = 750;
d = 749
We provide the negotiated levels of standards and transfers, the payo¤ levels from
cooperation and the gains from cooperation corresponding to these values of the
parameters in Tables 1, 2 and 3:
We have already provided, in the preceding section, the numerical results con-
cerning the investment decision of the rms. Here, we describe the welfare levels of
the countries with regard to the type of the negotiated IEA, taking into account the
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^
A;
^
A
 ^
NB;
^
NB

(x = 1; x= 0) (F = 0:2) 1; 0 374:8; 0:3755
(x = 1; x= 0) (F = 0:4) 1; 0 374:6; 0:3755
(x = x= 1) (F = 0:2) 0:999; 0:0009 374:8009; 0:1754
(x = x= 0) (F = 0:4) 1; 0 374:5; 0:3755
Table 1: The levels of standards and payo¤s at the Nash equilibrium
Standards; t NB;NB
D (x = 1; x= 0) (F = 0:2) A = 1;A= 0 374:8; 0:3755
D (x = 1; x= 0) (F = 0:4) A = 1;A= 0 374:6; 0:3755
UT (x = x= 1) (F = 0:2)
 
A= 0:5003; t = 0:24 374:9255; 0:30008
UT (x = x= 0) (F = 0:4)
 
A= 0:5 = t 374:5; 0:3755000173
Table 2: The levels of standards and payo¤s of cooperation
NB  
^
NB NB  
^
NB

D (x = 1; x= 0) (F = 0:2) 0 0
D (x = 1; x= 0) (F = 0:4) 0 0
UT (x = x= 1) (F = 0:2) 0:1245846 0:12458459
UT (x = x= 0) (F = 0:4) 0 0:173 10 7
Table 3: The levels of gains from cooperation in the agreements
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di¤erent permutations of investment decision by rms. Our numerical results illus-
trate our theoretical ndings: the implementation of the uniform agreement when
both rms invest is the only agreement which ensures positive gains from coopera-
tion for each country. The other negotiations, which are the uniform agreement when
no rm invests and the di¤erentiated agreement when only the rm of the ENCC
invests, lead to the same payo¤s from cooperation as those at the respective threat
points for each country. It is interesting to highlight the evolution of the payo¤s at
the threat point for di¤erent pairs of investment decision. Given the movement from
(x = 1, x = 0) to (x = x = 1), for instance, the investment decision of the rm
in the LENCC considerably reduces the bargaining position of its government in the
international negotiations. This manifests in the reduction of its payo¤ at the threat
point and correspondingly that of cooperation. This result is in line with the ndings
of McLaren (1997) on a small countrys bargaining position in the negotiations of
trade liberalization.
The results of this paper, contrary to Muulsstudy (2004), show that some Nash
bargained cooperative agreements cannot solve the problems of absence of investment
by the private sector. We show that the type of the bargained IEA, as well as the
level of sunk cost of the installation of the new abatement technology are the crucial
factors which determine the decision of rms to invest in environmentally-friendly
technologies.
5 Conclusion
In this paper, we have studied the link between the design of international environ-
mental agreements and the decision by the private sector to invest in a new abatement
technology. From this perspective, we have essentially compared the performance, in
the Pareto sense, of two second-best IEAs, an agreement on a uniform standard with
transfers and an agreement on di¤erentiated standards without transfers, by using a
multi-stage game.
Our ndings indicate a result which could seem counter intuitive. In the presence
of very asymmetric countries, the announcement and implementation of a uniform
agreement with transfers is optimal, if the level of sunk cost is su¢ ciently low and the
level of the marginal benet from global abatement is su¢ ciently high. In this case,
the implementation of the uniform agreement with transfers induces all the rms
to invest in a new abatement technology. Moreover, this agreement is the only one
which generates positive gains from cooperation for each country. In the presence of
a low level of sunk cost of investment, the su¢ ciently high level of the uniform stan-
dard, which plays the role of a signal to rms to invest, and the presence of transfer
payments, which satisfy the participation constraint of the country less sensitive to
pollution, mean that a constraining agreement on a uniform standard is preferred
by very asymmetric countries to the di¤erentiated agreement. Our ndings also in-
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dicate the sub-optimality of the announcement and implementation of the uniform
agreement with transfers in the presence of very asymmetric countries, if the level of
sunk cost is su¢ ciently high. In this case, the announcement and implementation of
the uniform agreement takes away the incentives of all rms to invest. Moreover, the
implementation of this agreement in this case is not able to generate positive gains
from cooperation for each country.
This paper essentially shows that whenever countries are able to partially commit,
uniform standards may be preferable as they create higher incentives for rms to
undertake investment in costly abatement technology. The countries only need to
commit to the announced type of IEAs, and not to the negotiated levels of the
provisions of the agreement, such as the levels of abatement standards and transfers.
From a normative point of view, the countries could use the following mechanism
in order to give incentives to rms to invest in a new abatement technology, and to
obtain for themselves higher levels of gain from cooperation. The countries would
collectively announce that a uniform agreement with transfers would be negotiated
in the future. Given this announcement, and conditional on the low levels of the sunk
cost of investment, the rms would invest. The best thing that the countries could
do is, rst, to give enough time for rms to invest in a new technology, and then
to negotiate the precise levels of the uniform standard and the transfer, taking into
account the investment decisions of their rms.
This work has considered some important aspects of IEAs, such as the type of
standards imposed on countries and the existence of a side payment scheme across
countries. As the OECD study (2005, p.14) points out, the Montreal Protocols
success relies on the involvement of industry to innovate, invest in, and transfer tech-
nologies. In this paper, we have only considered monetary transfers across countries.
The introduction of technological transfers, - which could be modeled as a payment
of the sunk cost of investment of the rm in the less sensitive country by the most
sensitive country -, or of technological spillovers, would, directly a¤ect the incentives
of the private sector to invest. Our paper, however, mainly emphasizes the role of the
type of international environmental agreement in giving incentives to rms to invest.
It is worth to noting that, behind the success of the Montreal Protocol, there are
other measures included in the Protocol, which encourage private sector involvement
and investment. We have not considered, for instance, trade-related incentives in
the form of trade restrictions between parties and non-parties and opportunities for
market creation for alternatives to ozone-depleting substances, which have played an
important role in the involvement of the business sector.
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Appendix
A- Reference Case: x = 1 and x = 0
A1- Comparison of the abatement levels (Proof of Lemma 1)
Proof. We will rst show that A and A cannot simultaneously be lower than
 
A:
If A and A are lower than
 
A; then we have:
B
0
(A+ A) > B
0
(
 
A+
 
A)
because B is a decreasing function, B
0
(A+ A) = A
1+A
and B
0
(
 
A+
 
A) =
 
A+1
2(+1)
:
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We need to check if ( A
1+A
) is higher than (
 
A+1
2(+1)
); given that A <
 
A: For that,
we will rst compare the functions f(x) = x
1+x
and g(x) = x+1
2(+1)
; where x is a
positive variable with x  1: We nd that the function f(x) = x
1+x
is lower or
equal to the function g(x) = x+1
2(+1)
25: Since the function g(x) is increasing, we have
g(
 
A) > g(A)  f(A): Hence, we nd that:
g(
 
A) > f(A)()
 
A+ 1
2(+ 1)
>
A
1 + A
which contradicts our initial assumption. This shows that A and A cannot si-
multaneously be lower than
 
A:
Now, we will show that A is lower than
 
A for a low value of parameter : Let
us rst consider the extreme case  = 0 in which the optimal abatement levels,
respectively at the di¤erentiated and the uniform cases are dened by:
A = 0 and B
0
(A) = A
B
0
(2
 
A) =
 
A+ 1
2
We observe that
 
A is positive whenever B
0
(0) > 1
2
: Under this condition, we show
that A <
 
A for a value of  = 0: Hence, under the same condition we have A >
 
A:
We can nd a similar result for a small value of ; in the neighborhood of  = 0;
using a continuity argument of the functions A() and
 
A() at the optimum. By
Berges theorem of the maximum, it can be shown that the social welfare function
and the set of maximizers change continuously with the parameters, given that the
objective function is continuous. Since we have a continuous objective function, we
can deduce that A <
 
A < A for small value of , in the neighborhood of  = 0.
B- Case 2: x =x = 1
B1- Nash equilibrium
The rst-order conditions for the ENCC and the LENCC are respectively:
25f(x) = x1+x  g(x) = x+12(+1)
() 2(+ 1)x  (1 + x)(x+ 1)
() 0  (1  x)(1  x)
which is true given that x  1 and (1  x) > 0 with  being lower than 1:
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B
0
(A+ A) = A
B
0
(A+ A) =
A

which implies A = A
1

where A > A
These conditions lead to the following abatement levels at the threat point:
^
A =
1
+ 1
B
0 1(
^
A)
^
A

=

1 + 
B
0 1(
^
A)
These abatement levels give us the payo¤s at the threat point when both rms
invest,
^
NB and
^
NB

; respectively for the ENCC and the LENCC:
^
NB = B(B
0 1(
^
a))  1
2(1 + )2
(B
0 1(
^
a))2   F
^
NB

= B(B
0 1(
^
a))  
2
2(1 + )2
(B
0 1(
^
a))2   F
B2- Di¤erentiated standards without transfers
If we arrange the rst-order conditions, we have:
B
0
(A+ A)
[B0(A+ A)  A] =

B
0
(A+ A)  A
B0(A+ A)
() B0(A+ A) = AA

A + A
(28)
If we arrange the rst-order conditions in a di¤erent way, we also have:
B
0
(A+ A)(U + U) = AU
B
0
(A+ A)(U + U) = AU
which implies:
AU = AU
If A > A, we obtain the superiority of the gains from cooperation of the ENCC
to those for the LENCC; i.e. U > U; and vice versa.
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B3- Uniform standard with transfers
As we have already showed (Equation 17), the gains from cooperation of the
countries are the same in the presence of uniform standard with transfers, i.e. U = U.
This property modies the rst-order condition with respect to
 
A and gives the
following:
() U

2B
0
(
 
A+
 
A) 
 
A+ 2B
0
(
 
A+
 
A) 
 
A

= 0
() B0(
 
A+
 
A) =
 
A
(+ 1)
(29)
B4- Comparaison of the levels of standards
Our objective is to compare the levels of standards resulting from the two agree-
ments. To do this, we use Equations 28 and 29.
Proposition 2
 
A is necessarily between A and A:
Proof. We will rst show that A and A cannot simultaneously be lower than
 
A:
If A <
 
A and A <
 
A; then we would have:
B
0
(A+ A) > B
0
(
 
A+
 
A)() AA

A + A
>
 
A
(+ 1)
(30)
There are two sub-cases to study, A > A or A < A:
a) If A > A; as 1A
A
+
< 1
(+1)
and A <
 
A; then A

A
A
+
<
 
A
(+1)
; which is
contradictory to Condition (c1).
b) If A < A; as 1
1+ A
A
< 1
(+1)
and A <
 
A; then A
1+ A
A
<
 
A
(+1)
; which is
contradictory to Condition (c1).
These results show the impossibility of having A <
 
A and A <
 
A: There are two
possibilities left: one of the di¤erentiated standards or both of them exceed the level
of the uniform standard. We now show, by similar reasoning, that A and A cannot
simultaneously be higher than
 
A:
If A >
 
A and A >
 
A; then we would have:
B
0
(A+ A) < B
0
(
 
A+
 
A)() AA

A + A
<
 
A
(+ 1)
(31)
There are two sub-cases to examine, A > A or A < A:
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a) If A > A; as 1
1+ A
A
> 1
(+1)
and A >
 
A; then A
1+ A
A
>
 
A
(+1)
; which is
contradictory to Condition (c2).
b) If A < A; as 1A
A
+
> 1
(+1)
and A >
 
A; then A

A
A
+
>
 
A
(+1)
; which is
contradictory to Condition (c2).
These results show the impossibility of having A >
 
A and A >
 
A: Consequently,
 
A is necessarily between A and A:
Proposition 3 A > A for a small value of , in the neighborhood of
 = 0:
Proof. We have AU = AU:
Let us suppose that A  A; then we have U  U
()

B(A+ A)  A2
2
  B(
^
A+
^
A

) +
^
A
2
2


B(A+ A)  A2
2
 B(
^
A+
^
A

) +
^
A
2
2

() (A   A)(A + A)  2

(  1)B(A+ A) + (1  )B(
^
A+
^
A

) 
^
A
2
2
+
^
A
2
2

where
^
A =
^
A


:
() (A A)(A+A)  2
24(  1) B(A+ A) B(^A+ ^A)+ ^A2(  1)(+ 1)
22
35
(32)
The lefthandside of Condition 32 is positive or zero. This condition can be rejected
if the righthandside is negative. We know that
^
A
2
( 1)(+1)
22
is negative because  < 1:
We now check if the di¤erence

B(A+ A) B(
^
A+
^
A

)

is positive or zero.
It can be useful to remember the respective rst-order conditions at the threat
point and the di¤erentiated standard case for the ENCC and the LENCC respectively:
B
0
(
^
A+
^
A

) =
^
A and B
0
(
^
A+
^
A

) =
^
A


B
0
(A+ A) = AU

U+U and B
0
(A+ A) = A
U
U+U
We can compare the levels of standards at the threat point and at cooperation
with di¤erentiated standards, for the case  = 0. We notice that these levels are
given by the following relationships:
^
A

= 0 and B
0
(
^
A) =
^
A
A = 0 and B
0
(A) = A
Since these optimal standards at the threat point and at cooperation are dened
in the same manner, we can conclude that the total abatement at the threat point
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(
^
A +
^
A

) is equal to that at cooperation (A + A). We can nd a similar result for
a small value of , in the neighborhood of  = 0, using a continuity argument of
the functions A() and A() at the optimum. Under this property, we can claim
that the di¤erence

B(A+ A) B(
^
A+
^
A

)

is zero, which leads to the negativity
of the righthandside of Condition 32, and then leads us to reject the condition. Con-
sequently, it is impossible to have A  A, then we have A > A for a small value of
, in the neighborhood of  = 0.
These results contribute to the classication of the abatement levels in the case
where the rms in the ENCC and the LENCC invest. We have A <
 
A < A under
the conditions specied above.
C- Case 3: x =x = 0
C1- Nash equilibrium
The rst-order conditions for the ENCC and the LENCC are respectively:
B
0
(A+ A) = 1
B
0
(A+ A)  1 < 0
These conditions imply the following abatement levels at the threat point:
^
A = B
0 1(1)
^
A

= 0
Then, the payo¤s at the threat point when none of the rms invest,
^
NB and
^
NB

;
for the ENCC and the LENCC are respectively:
^
NB = B(B
0 1(1)) B0 1(1)
^
NB

= B(B
0 1(1))
C2- Di¤erentiated standards with transfers
If we arrange the rst-order conditions, we have:
B
0
(A+ A)
[B0(A+ A)  1] =

B
0
(A+ A)  1
B0(A+ A)
() B0(A+ A) = 1
1 + 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If we arrange the rst-order conditions in a di¤erent way, we also have:
B
0
(A+ A)(U + U) = U
B
0
(A+ A)(U + U) = U
which implies:
U = U
We obtain the equality of the gains from cooperation across the ENCC and the
LENCC; in the presence of di¤erentiated standards without transfers.
C3- Uniform standard with transfers
As we have already showed (Equation 17), the gains from cooperation of the
countries are identical in the presence of uniform standards with transfers. This
property modies the rst-order condition with respect to
 
A and gives us:
() U

2B
0
(
 
A+
 
A)  1 + 2B0(
 
A+
 
A)  1

= 0
() B0(
 
A+
 
A) =
1
(+ 1)
C4- Comparison of the levels of standards
Proposition 4 The level of the uniform standard is the average of the
levels of the di¤erentiated standards.
Proof. The optimality conditions are identical in the cases of di¤erentiated stan-
dards without transfers and uniform standards with transfers, and are equal to:
B
0
(A+ A) =
1
(+ 1)
= B
0
(
 
A+
 
A)
This identity implies the following relationship:
A+ A = 2
 
A()
 
A =
A+ A
2
Proposition 5 Given the assumption that the benet function B(:) is
increasing and concave, A is superior to A:
Proof. We have U = U
()

B(A+ A)  A 
^
NB

=

B(A+ A)  A  
^
NB

where
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^
NB

= B(
^
A) and
^
NB = B(
^
A) 
^
A with
^
A

= 0 and
^
A = B
0 1(1):
() A = A + (1  )B(A+ A) + (
^
NB

 
^
NB)
We know that (1  )B(A+ A) > 0: We will have A > A if
(1  )B(A+ A) + (
^
NB

 
^
NB)

> 0 (33)
We have
^
NB

 
^
NB = (  1)B(
^
A) +
^
A = (  1)B(B0 1(1)) +B0 1(1):
Condition 33, then, becomes: (1  ) B(A+ A) B(B0 1(1))+B0 1(1) > 0
() (1   ) B(B0 1( 1
1+
)) B(B0 1(1)) + B0 1(1) > 0 because B0(A + A) =
1
1+
:
This condition is always satised by the concavity of the benet function B(:):
Then, we have A > A:
D- Case 4: x = 0 and x = 1 ( = 0)
D1- Nash equilibrium
The rst-order conditions for the ENCC and the LENCC are respectively:
B
0
(A+ A) = 1
^
A

= 0
because the payo¤ of the LENCC is equal to ( A2
2
  F ):
These conditions imply the following abatement levels at the threat point:
^
A = B
0 1(1)
^
A

= 0
D2- Di¤erentiated standards without transfers
The rst-order condition for the LENCC is the following:
B
0
(A+ A)U = AU
where U =  A2
2
: Since a positive value of A implies a negative U; the optimal
value of A is equal to zero.
The rst-order condition for the LENCC is the following:
B
0
(A+ A) = 1
These conditions imply the following abatement levels in the di¤erentiated case:
43
A4 = B
0 1(1)
A4 = 0
For the situation x = 0 and x = 1 to emerge, some conditions must be satised:
1) The rm in the ENCC does not invest in the agreement on di¤erentiated
standards without transfers.
threshold condition: A4 <

A or
cost condition: A4 >

A and A4 <
A22
2
+ F
2) The rm in the LENCC invests in the agreement on di¤erentiated standards
without transfers.
A4 >

A and
A24
2
+ F < A3
We observe that, in the case  = 0; Condition 2 is not satised, because A4 =
0 <

A; given the denition of the threshold abatement 0 <

A  1: We can nd a
similar result for a small value of ; in the neighborhood of  = 0; using a continuity
argument of the functions A() and A() at the optimum. We deduce that x = 0
and x = 1 is impossible for a small value of , in the neighborhood of  = 0.
E- Comparison of the levels of the uniform standard
Proposition 6
 
A(x = x = 1) 
 
A(x = 1;x = 0):
Proof. For x = 1 and x = 0; we have B0(
 
A +
 
A) =
 
A+1
2(+1)
: We call
 
A1 this
uniform standard.
For x = x = 1; we have B
0
(
 
A+
 
A) =
 
A
(+1)
: We call
 
A2 this uniform standard.
If
 
A1 >
 
A2; then we would have
 
A1 + 1 >
 
A2 + 1 > 2
 
A2:
As
 
A1 >
 
A2; we have:
() B0(
 
A1 +
 
A1) < B
0
(
 
A2 +
 
A2) ()
 
A1+1
2(+1)
<
 
A2
(+1)
()
 
A1 + 1 < 2
 
A2: This
result is contradictory to the former assumption. Hence, we have
 
A1 
 
A2:
Proposition 7
 
A(x = x = 0) 
 
A(x = 1;x = 0):
Proof. For x = 1 and x = 0; we have B0(
 
A +
 
A) =
 
A+1
2(+1)
: We call
 
A1 this
uniform standard.
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For x = x = 0; we have B
0
(
 
A+
 
A) = 1
(+1)
: We call
 
A3 this uniform standard.
If
 
A3 >
 
A1; then we would have B
0
(
 
A3 +
 
A3) < B
0
(
 
A1 +
 
A1) () 1(+1) <
 
A1+1
2(+1)
()
 
A1 > 1; which is impossible because the maximal abatement level is equal
to 1. Hence, we have
 
A3 
 
A1:
F- Negotiated Abatement Levels for  = 0 (not to be pub-
lished)
At the Nash equilibrium, the program of the ENCC is as follows:
MaxA

B(A+ A)  x(A
2
2
+ F )  (1  x)A

A  1;A  1
The program of the LENCC is written in a similar way:
MaxA

 x(A
2
2
+ F )  (1  x)A

A  1;A  1
The rst-order conditions for the ENCC and the LENCC are respectively:
B
0
(A+ A) = Ax+ (1  x)
 Ax   (1  x) = 0
F In the case that the ENCC invests and the LENCC does not invest (x = 1 and
x = 0), the rst-order conditions for the ENCC and the LENCC imply:
^
A = 0
^
A = B
0 1(
^
a)
F In the case that the ENCC and the LENCC invest (x = x = 1), the rst-order
conditions for the ENCC and the LENCC imply the same relationships:
^
A = 0
^
A = B
0 1(
^
a)
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F In the case that the ENCC and the LENCC do not invest (x = x = 0), the
rst-order conditions for the ENCC and the LENCC become:
^
A = 0
^
A = B
0 1(1)
In cooperation with the agreement of di¤erentiated standards without transfers,
the Nash bargaining solution is written in the following way:
MaxA;A
"
B(A+ A)  x(A2
2
+ F )  (1  x)A
 fB(
^
A+
^
A)  x(
^
A
2
2
+ F )  (1  x)
^
Ag
#
"  x(A2
2
+ F )  (1  x)A
 f x(
^
A
2
2
+ F )  (1  x)
^
Ag
#
A  1;A  1
If we note V = U  U; given an interior solution, the rst-order conditions are
as follows:
@V
@A
= 0() @U

@A
U +
@U
@A
U = 0
()
h
B
0
(A+ A)  xA  (1  x)
i
U = 0
@V
@A
= 0() @U

@A
U +
@U
@A
U = 0
() [ xA   (1  x)]U +
h
B
0
(A+ A)
i
U = 0
F In the case that the ENCC invests and the LENCC does not invest (x = 1 and
x = 0), the rst-order conditions imply:
A1 = 0 and A1 = B
0 1(A1)
which are the same conditions as those at the Nash equilibrium. This property
could lead to identical levels of abatement at the threat point and at cooperation.
In this case, given that  = 0; at cooperation with di¤erentiated standards, each
country receives what it gets at the threat point.
F In the case that the ENCC and the LENCC invest (x = x = 1), the rst-order
conditions imply:
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A2 = 0 and A2 = B
0 1(A2)
because U =  A2
2
:
F In the case that the ENCC and the LENCC do not invest (x = x = 0), the
rst-order conditions are:
A3 = 0 and A3 = B
0 1(1)
because U =  A:
In cooperation with the agreement on a uniform standard with transfers, the Nash
bargaining solution is written in the following way:
Max 
A;t
24 B( A+  A)  x( A22 + F )  (1  x) A  t
 fB(
^
A+
^
A)  x(
^
A
2
2
+ F )  (1  x)
^
Ag
35
24  x( A22 + F )  (1  x) A+ t
 f x(
^
A
2
2
+ F )  (1  x)
^
Ag
35
 
A  1
If we note V = U  U; given an interior solution, the rst-order conditions are:
@V
@t
= 0() @U

@t
U +
@U
@t
U = 0() U   U = 0() U = U
@V
@
 
A
= 0() @U

@
 
A
U +
@U
@
 
A
U = 0
() B0(
 
A+
 
A) =
 
A(x+ x) + 2  x  x
2
F In the case that the ENCC invests and the LENCC does not invest (x = 1 and
x = 0), the marginal benet of the ENCC becomes:
() B0(2
 
A) =
 
A+ 1
2
()
 
A1 = 2B
0
(2
 
A1)  1
F In the case that the ENCC and the LENCC invest (x = x = 1), the marginal
benet of the ENCC is:
() B0(2
 
A) =
 
A()
 
A2 = B
0
(2
 
A2)
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F In the case that the ENCC and the LENCC do not invest (x = x = 0), the
marginal benet of the ENCC is:
() B0(2
 
A) = 1()
 
A3 =
1
2
B
0 1
(1)
G- Optimal choice of the type of the IEA
G1- Proof of Proposition 1a
Proof. We investigate the following condition:
B(
 
A+
 
A) 
 
A
2
2
  F   t 
^
NB2



B(A+ A)  A2
2
  F  
^
NB1


B(
 
A+
 
A) 
 
A
2
2
  F + t 
^
NB

2



B(A+ A)  A  
^
NB

1

and for one of
the two countries, the inequality is strict.
In the case where only the rm in the ENCC invests and  = 0; we can verify that
the Nash equilibrium is dened by
^
A

= 0 and B
0
(
^
A) =
^
A: The payo¤ levels at the
Nash equilibrium are equal to
^
NB1 = B(B
0 1(
^
A1))  12(B
0 1(
^
A1))
2 F and
^
NB

1 = 0:
The levels of di¤erentiated standards are characterized in the same way by A = 0
and B
0
(A) = A: This property leads to the equality of the payo¤ levels with the
di¤erentiated agreement without transfers when only the rm of the ENCC invests,
and those at the threat point. Similarly, we can check that the Nash equilibrium is
dened by
^
A

= 0 and B
0
(
^
A) =
^
A when both rms invest and  = 0: The payo¤ levels
at the Nash equilibrium are now equal to
^
NB2 = B(B
0 1(
^
A2))   12(B
0 1(
^
A2))
2   F
and
^
NB

2 =  F:
Our objective is to nd a specic contract which Pareto-dominates the agreement
on di¤erentiated standards dened above. This alternative contract is a contract on
a uniform standard with a side payment scheme. The payo¤ of the LENCC must be
positive after the receipt of side payments, given the constraint that the payo¤ of the
ENCC after the payment of transfers exceeds that at the threat point:
We dene t, such that t =
 
A
2
2
+ F +
^
NB

2 + " where " > 0 (34)
B(2
 
A) 
 
A
2
2
  F   t >
^
NB2 =) B(2
 
A) 
 
A
2
  2F  
^
NB

2   " >
^
NB2
By using the expression of payo¤s at the threat point
^
NB2 and
^
NB

2; Condition
34 takes the following form:
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
B(2
 
A) 
 
A
2
  "

>
24B(^A)  ^A2
2
35 where " > 0 (35)
We can nd a level of the uniform standard, assuming that it exists, which max-
imizes the lefthandside of this condition, and which allows us to check Condition
35:
Max 
A

B(2
 
A) 
 
A
2
  "

>
24B(^A)  ^A2
2
35 where " > 0 (36)
This condition can be satised if the function B(2
 
A) increases su¢ ciently fast,
or if B
0
(2
 
A) is su¢ ciently large.Under this condition, the specic contract on a uni-
form standard with transfers gives positive gains from cooperation for each country,
and therefore, Pareto-dominates the agreement on di¤erentiated standards without
transfers. Here we have found specic levels of
 
A and t such that this particular con-
tract on a uniform standard outperforms the agreement on di¤erentiated standards.
Hence, the maximum of the program with uniform standards (the agreement on a
uniform standard with transfers) Pareto-dominates the agreement on di¤erentiated
standards without transfers.
G2- Illustration of Proposition 1a: quadratic example with  = 0
The benet function has the following form:
B(A+ A) = b(A+ A)  d
2
(A+ A)2
where b > 0 and d > 0:
We know that the Nash equilibrium is dened by
^
A

= 0 and B
0
(
^
A) =
^
A for
 = 0: With the assumed specication of the benet function, we obtain:
B(A) = b(A)  d
2
(A)2
B
0
(A) = A() b  dA = A()
^
A =
b
d+ 1
By introducing this expression of the abatement level at the Nash equilibrium in
the righthandside of Condition 36, we obtain:
B(
^
A) 
^
A
2
2
= b(
^
A) 
^
A
2 (d+ 1)
2
=
b2
2(d+ 1)
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The maximum of the expression (with respect to
 
A) in the lefthandside of Con-
dition 36,

B(2
 
A) 
 
A
2
  "

; is obtained by B
0
(2
 
A) =
 
A: The specication of the
benet function gives us this specic level of the uniform standard:
B
0
(2
 
A) =
 
A() b  2d
 
A =
 
A()
 
A =
b
1 + 2d
When we introduce this expression of the uniform standard in the lefthandside of
Condition 36, we obtain:

B(2
 
A) 
 
A
2
  "

=

b(2
 
A)  d
2
(2
 
A)2  
 
A
2
  "

=
2b2
1 + 2d
  (2d+ 1) b
2
(1 + 2d)2
  "
If we divide by (b2) both sides of Condition 36, we have:
2
1 + 2d
  (2d+ 1)
(1 + 2d)2
  "
b2
>
1
2(d+ 1)
The limit of this condition when b!1; is as follows:
2
1 + 2d
  (2d+ 1)
(1 + 2d)2
>
1
2(d+ 1)
() 3 > 2.
G3- Proof of Proposition 1b
Proof. We investigate the following condition:
B(A+ A)  A2
2
  F  
^
NB1



B(
 
A+
 
A) 
 
A  t 
^
NB3


B(A+ A)  A  
^
NB

1



B(
 
A+
 
A) 
 
A+ t 
^
NB

3

and for one of the
two countries, the inequality is strict.
In the case where only the rm in the ENCC invests and  = 0; we know from
the proof of Proposition 1a that the abatement levels at the Nash equilibrium and
the agreement on di¤erentiated standards are characterized in the same way: This
property leads to the equality of the payo¤ levels whether the countries cooperate
or not. Similarly, we can check that the Nash equilibrium is dened by
^
A

= 0
and B
0
(
^
A) = 1, when no rm invests and  = 0: The levels of payo¤s at the Nash
equilibrium are equal to:
^
NB3 = B(B
0 1(1)) B0 1(1) and
^
NB

3 = 0:
We know from Equation 17 that the maximum of the program with uniform
standards when no rm invests, implies the equality of the gains from cooperation
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for the two countries, i.e. U = U: This property modies the rst-order condition
with respect to
 
A; and gives the following condition:
U

B
0
(2
 
A)(2+ 2)  2

= 0() B0(2
 
A) =
1
+ 1
(37)
() 2
 
A = B
0 1(
1
+ 1
)()
 
A =
1
2
B
0 1(
1
+ 1
)
When the parameter  is zero, the uniform standard is equal to:
 
A =
1
2
B
0 1(1) (38)
In order to nd the value of transfers t, we use the equality of the gains from
cooperation across the countries:
U = U () B(2
 
A) 
 
A  t 
^
NB3 = B(2
 
A) 
 
A+ t 
^
NB

3 (39)
() t = 1  
2
B(2
 
A)  1
2
^
NB3 +
1
2
^
NB

3
When the parameter  is zero, the level of transfers is given by:
t =
1
2
B(2
 
A)  1
2
^
NB3 +
1
2
^
NB

3 () t =
1
2
B(2
 
A)  1
2
^
NB3 (40)
We can now investigate the gains from cooperation for the agreement of uniform
standards with transfers when no rm invests:
U = U =

B(2
 
A) 
 
A  t 
^
NB3

=
"
B(21
2
B
0 1(1))  (1
2
B
0 1(1)) 
1
2
B(21
2
B
0 1(1)) + 1
2
^
NB3  
^
NB3
#
= 0
(41)
We note that the gains from cooperation are zero in both cases of a uniform
standard with transfers, when no rm invests, and of di¤erentiated standards without
transfers, when the rm of the ENCC invests.
H- Conditions of Existence of the Incentive Uniform Stan-
dardand Disincentive Uniform StandardCases ( = 0) (not
to be published)
Given the negotiated standards with  = 0, the conditions of existence of the
situation incentive uniform standardtake the following forms:
1) A1 <

A() 0 < 1 p1  2F
which is satised, given that 0 <

A  1:
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2i)
 
A1 >

A() 2b  1
1 + 4d
> 1 p1  2F () F < 1
2
  1
2
(1  2b  1
1 + 4d
)2
2ii)
 
A
2
2
2
+ F <
 
A1 () 1
2
(
b
1 + 2d
)2 + F <
2b  1
1 + 4d
()
F <
2b  1
1 + 4d
  1
2
(
b
1 + 2d
)2 and
 
A
2
2
2
+ F <
 
A3 () 1
2
(
b
1 + 2d
)2 + F <
b  1
2d
()
F <
b  1
2d
  1
2
(
b
1 + 2d
)2
3i) A1 >

A() b
1 + d
> 1 p1  2F () F < 1
2
  1
2
(1  b
1 + d
)2
3ii)
A21
2
+ F < A3 () 1
2
(
b
1 + d
)2 + F <
b  1
d
()
F <
b  1
d
  1
2
(
b
1 + d
)2
We also have an additional condition on the level of sunk cost, F  1=2; implied
by the constraint

A  1:
The conditions of existence of the situation disincentive uniform standardtake
the following forms:
1) A1 <

A() 0 < 1 p1  2F
which is satised, given that 0 <

A  1:
2i) A1 >

A() b
1 + d
> 1 p1  2F () F < 1
2
  1
2
(1  b
1 + d
)2
2ii)
A21
2
+ F < A3 () 1
2
(
b
1 + d
)2 + F <
b  1
d
() F < b  1
d
  1
2
(
b
1 + d
)2
3.1) (threshold condition)
 
A1 <

A() 2b  1
1 + 4d
< 1 p1  2F ()
F >
1
2
  1
2
(1  2b  1
1 + 4d
)2
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3.2.i) (cost condition)
 
A1 >

A() 2b  1
1 + 4d
> 1 p1  2F ()
F <
1
2
  1
2
(1  2b  1
1 + 4d
)2
3.2.ii)
 
A
2
1
2
+ F >
 
A3 () 1
2
(
2b  1
1 + 4d
)2 + F >
b  1
2d
()
F >
b  1
2d
  1
2
(
2b  1
1 + 4d
)2 and
 
A
2
2
2
+ F >
 
A3 () 1
2
(
b
1 + 2d
)2 + F >
b  1
2d
()
F >
b  1
2d
  1
2
(
b
1 + 2d
)2
We also introduce the additional condition on the level of sunk cost, F  1=2.
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